Over the next two decades, the relationships between states and their societies in every region are likely to face persistent tensions because of a growing mismatch between what publics need or expect and what governments can or are willing to deliver. In many countries, populations with expectations heightened by previous prosperity are likely to face greater strains and disruptions from slowing economic growth, uncertain job opportunities, and changing demographics. These populations also will be better equipped to advocate for their interests after decades of steady improvements in education and access to communication technologies as well as the greater coherence of like-minded groups.
Although trust in government institutions is low among the mass public, people are likely to continue to view the state as ultimately responsible for addressing their challenges, and to demand more from their governments to deliver solutions. While populations are exercising more potent public voices, governments will experience mounting pressure from economic constraints and a mix of demographic, environmental, and other challenges. Individually and collectively, these pressures will test states’ capacity and resilience, deplete budgets, and add to the complexity of governing.
Many countries will struggle to build on or even sustain the human development successes achieved in the past several decades because of setbacks from the global pandemic of Covid-19, slower global economic growth, the effects of conflict and climate, and more difficult steps required to meet higher development goals.
Meanwhile, countries with aging populations and those with youthful and growing populations will each face unique sets of challenges associated with those demographics. Migration is likely to increase the salience of identity issues that divide societies in receiving countries and may fuel ethnic conflicts. Rapid urbanisation—occurring mostly in Africa and Asia—will stress governments’ ability to provide adequate infrastructure, security, and resources for these growing cities.
Responding to Climate Change and Environmental Degradation will strain governments in every region. The impact will be particularly acute in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, where governments are already weak, stressed, or fragile. Wealthy countries will also increasingly face environmental costs and even disasters that challenge governments’ responsiveness and resources, potentially undermining public trust.
The expected trend of slowing economic growth is likely to strain the resources and capacity of governments to provide services. Governments are already saddled with debt on an unprecedented scale. In addition, rising or persistent inequality within many states, coupled with corruption, will threaten people’s faith in government and trust in one another.
Governments will be hard pressed to keep up with the pace of technological change and implement policies that harness the benefits and mitigate the risks and disruptions. Technological advances will also empower individuals and no-state actors to challenge the role of the state in new ways. In the face of these challenges, existing systems and models of governance are proving inadequate to meet the expectations of populations. The result is a growing disequilibrium between public demands and governments’ ability to deliver economic opportunity and security. This public pessimism cuts across right-wing, left-wing, and centrist governments, democratic and authoritarian states, and populist and technocratic administrations.
In coming years, this mismatch between governments’ abilities and publics’ expectations is likely to expand and lead to more political volatility, including growing polarization and populism within political systems, waves of activism and protest movements, and, in the most extreme cases, violence, internal conflict, or even state collapse. Variations in state capacity, ideology, and prior histories with mobilization will shape how and when public discontent translates into political volatility in each country.
Polarization along ethnic, religious, and ideological lines is likely to remain strong, as political leaders and well-organized groups push a wide variety of broad goals and approaches that cut across economic, governance, social, identity, and international issues. In some countries, such polarization is likely to increase and reinforce political dysfunction and gridlock and heighten risks of political instability. Once established, severe polarization is difficult to reverse.
Public dissatisfaction with mainstream politics for failing to address economic or social grievances has also led to the global rise in populism during the past several decades—measured in both the number of populist leaders in power and populist party vote shares worldwide. Although some populists will falter in office, the populist appeal is likely to endure as long as dissatisfaction, polarization, and fractured information landscapes persist. In addition, populism tends to surge after economic crises or changes in the ethnic or religious composition of a society from migration.
Anti-government protests have increased globally since 2010, affecting every regime and government type. Although protests are a signal of political turbulence, they can also be a sign of democratic health and a force for democratization by pressing for accountability and political change. The protest phenomenon is likely to persist in cycles and waves because of the enduring nature of the underlying drivers, including ongoing public dissatisfaction and desire for systemic change, insufficient government responses, and pervasive technology to organize protests rapidly.
During the next two decades, increased volatility is likely to lead to the breakdown of political order and outbreak of political violence in numerous countries, particularly in the developing world. This volatile political climate creates vulnerabilities for all types of governments, from established liberal democracies to closed authoritarian systems. Adaptability and performance are likely to be key factors in the relative rise and fall of democratic and authoritarian governance during the next 20 years.
Governments that harness new opportunities, adapt to rising pressures, manage growing social fragmentation, and deliver security and economic prosperity for their populations will preserve or strengthen their legitimacy, whereas those that fail will inspire competitors or demands for alternative models. Democracies will also have the advantage of drawing legitimacy from the fairness and inclusivity of their political systems—attributes harder to achieve in authoritarian systems.
The challenges governments face suggest there is a high risk that an ongoing trend in erosion of democratic governance will continue during at least the next decade and perhaps longer. This trend has been widespread—seen in established, wealthy, liberal democracies as well as less mature partial democracies. Key democratic traits, including freedom of expression and the press, judicial independence, and protections for minorities, are deteriorating globally with countries sliding in the direction of greater authoritarianism. Several internal and external forces are driving this democratic erosion.
In some Western democracies, public distrust of the capabilities and policies of established parties and elites, as well as anxieties about economic dislocations, status reversals, and immigration, have fuelled the rise of illiberal leaders who are undermining democratic norms and institutions and civil liberties. Looking forward, many democracies are likely to be vulnerable to further erosion and even collapse. An academic study of 75 democracies that experienced substantial democratic decline since 1994 found that 60 of them (80 percent) eventually became autocracies.
However, the decline is not inexorable, and it may ultimately reflect a bad patch in a long cycle that has seen democracy advance and retreat with an overarching trend to more democracy during the past century. The long-term legitimacy of democratic systems hinges on two general conditions: maintaining a fair, inclusive, and equitable political process and delivering positive outcomes for populations. Addressing public concerns about corruption, elite capture, and inequality can help restore public trust and strengthen institutional legitimacy.
In addition, providing effective services, economic stability, and personal security—historically advantages for democracies—increases public satisfaction. Beyond these basic governance benchmarks, demonstrating resilience to emerging global challenges will help restore and maintain public confidence. Authoritarian regimes will face many of the same risks as democracies, and many may be less adaptable, making a sudden, violent change of government after a period of apparent stability more likely.
To try to quell, withstand, or address public discontent, authoritarian regimes are using new and traditional forms of coercion, co-optation, and legitimation. Technology has helped make authoritarian regimes more durable in recent years, in part because digitization and communication technologies make surveillance more pervasive and less costly. The flip side of these technological trends is that they have given populations the tools to circumvent digital repression and mobilize dissent. In addition to repression, regimes will rely on co-optation to convince critical allies to stay loyal, but this dynamic depends on more tenuous flows of resources.
Many authoritarian governments will seek to build popular legitimacy through effective government performance and compelling ideologies. With their centralized power, some authoritarian regimes have demonstrated faster and more flexible responses to emerging challenges, but historically authoritarian governments have suffered from lack of innovation caused by misallocation of resources. Authoritarian regimes that deliver economic opportunities and maintain security may convince their publics that their system is better suited to dealing with the complexity and speed of tomorrow’s world.
The combination of widespread public discontent and major crises or shocks could create conditions that are ripe for significant shifts or transformations in the models, ideologies, or ways of governing. Historically, ideological shifts across regions have taken place at moments of catastrophic crisis, such as in the wake of a major war or economic collapse, because people are more willing to embrace bold systemic changes to address overarching problems.
(The views expressed are personal)
