On 17th instant late evening a UO Note from the secretary to the chief minister to the DGP went viral wherein it was informed to take precautionary measures as 900 militants trained in weaponised drone, projectile and rocket usage are reaching Manipur and they are grouped into teams of 30 and they are likely to attack at multiple locations in a coordinated manner around September 28 at Meitei villages. It created instant panic and it was expected that if it was fake, the government would issue a clarification. It was not forthcoming.
If it was genuine, the government should be concerned with the leak but no inquiry on how the leak occurred being held was reported. However, a local TV channel that carried this news deleted the same, indicating that pressure was built on it to retract. Thus, by the next day one came to the conclusion that it must be genuine. On closer examination of the copy of the UO note that was circulated on social media it was found that it was not classified as either “Top Secret” or “Secret” or even “Confidential” as it is wont for any such information. This forces one to come to the conclusion that it was a deliberate leak on the part of the government.
After the ambush on the CM’s carcade moving towards Jiribam though without the CM, it came to light that on January 15, a UO note was sent by the CMO to the DGP about the movement of 200 Kuki militants from Churachandpur and had reached Phaitol, Old and New Kaiphundai bordering Jiribam District and the DGP received lots of flaks on the inability to timely act upon the inputs. One question that arises is whether the CMO has its own intelligence network, beyond that of the state police?
To this one can say that politicians have their own network to gather information and those having a good network ensures his return in the next election. But in respect of movement of armed militants it is doubtful as none of the Kuki politicians are having a good relationship with the CM, barring a few who have limited access to such information as they are persona non grata in both the Kuki dominated area and the central Imphal valley. But such inputs that emanated from the CMO cannot be taken lightly.
This leak caused concern among the people in the valley and the Advisor (Security) had to come out in a press conference claiming that the security agencies are taking all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the people and all security apparatus have been put under full alert. However, Spear Corps in its X handle questioned about the details of this input that was quickly taken down’ though some national media had carried the query of the Army. Thus there is more than the eye could see. The Kuki organisations and leaders had debunked the inputs as blatantly false and trained their gun on the CM and then to the Advisor (Security), which was not unexpected.
If the input is correct, it is a piece of intelligence on which counter measures can be put in place but it will not be easy to stop such incursion as the border is too long and the deployment of forces thin with no border fencing, except for a length of less than 30 km out of the 398 km.
However, the security apparatus is reportedly put under full alert to foil any attempt to infiltrate including activating the intelligence network. It may also be appreciated that Kuki in Sagaing Division are fighting the Takmadaw and it will be next to impossible to send such a large number of trained manpower to fight in Manipur. Yes there have been reports of lungi-clad fighters in the early days of the crisis but these were not well trained and many had reportedly died due to their lack of skill in fighting such type of battles; though their deaths went unnoticed or unreported as the Kuki wants to hide as it will show that aliens are involved in the fight and their unreported death has no consequences as there cannot be any claim for ex gratia etc as they do not carry or have Aadhaar and if they carry at all these are likely to be fakes and will be noticed immediately on scrutiny.
Nine hundred trained armed personnel is not a small number and even if they infiltrate at all, it will have to be in the small numbers crossing the border in batches. Movement of such a large number will be detected almost immediately and can be ambushed anywhere. If at all, the intel is correct, it is likely that they were people sent for training across the border and the intel is most likely about their return.
If the intel is correct, the leak would have put them under pressure and crossing the border may be delayed or postponed awaiting a more opportune moment. The crossing cannot be in Kamjong or Tengnoupal districts, as even small group will be reported as there are a number of Naga villages and there is no love lost between the two communities. So, theoretically the crossing has to be in Chandel and Churachandpur district as the borders are more loosely guarded and even now border crossing is practiced regularly by the common folks as per reports received. The drug route can be used by them and perhaps very few will be wiser if they adopt this route. Thus, the alert level in the border of the two districts has to be at the maximum.
This intel has put the AR, the force that was tasked to guard the border at severe strain as they have limited manpower to guard the border and the deployment to say the least is fairly thin. There is no regular patrol and they rely more on ambushes. This leak with the alleged arrest of a person who was claimed to be a spy for the KNA-B by the AR and who was handed over to the Manipur police buttress the claim about the involvement of foreign hands. However, when information was last received, this person was of weak mind and was booked under the Foreigners Act only.
Perhaps by this time other sections of the law may have been invoked. This leak as mentioned above buttresses the claim about the involvement of foreign elements. And this is widely believed as the Meitei Insurgent Groups and the NSCN-IM are at loggerheads with the CDF and the KNA-B in Myanmar and there is a series of skirmishes going across the border at Min Thar, Kundaung, Phayang and Tap areas in Myanmar during the last few months, including very recently. Thus to take the fight outside Myanmar they may have infiltrated the border now and then for a short distance but there is no reason why they should come en masse, say to Kangpokpi or Churachandpur to fight not their battle but for their kiths and kin, when they themselves are embroiled in tough battles on their home turf, with many of their villages destroyed.
The intel, even if true, is really not very actionable as mentioned above as the areas to be kept under watch by the security agencies are vast and long. The focus ought to be on the border of Churachandpur and Chandel as there are reports of arms coming in through this sector. But as the Kuki and the security apparatus are not at logger heads unlike that with the Naga and the Meitei, the presence is usually thin covering a long stretch of inhospitable terrain.
Perhaps a change in the priority needs to be considered as joining the crisis by trained armed militants of that number can lead to further escalation. One thing is that there seems that the meetings of the so called Unified Command was not held frequently as envisaged in the order where they are to meet every second Wednesday and even the Operation group seems not meeting that frequently as the surprise of the army over the intel indicate.
There should have been frequent exchange of intel and other information but it seems not so and there is a need for better coordination among the various agencies including the intelligence agencies to combat the crisis. It also needs to remember that all intel does not come true as there may be flaws in the report itself, or that changes have been made in the operation after it was leaked. The input from the CMO may be a false alarm or even a red herring but it would be incompetent or even stupid not to act on it in time.
(The views expressed are personal)
