In a TV interview PK Mishra former ADG of BSF had categorically stated that to bring normalcy in Manipur, one particular Central Para Military Force needed to be transferred out from the state. Though he did not name the force, the meaning is clear and it reinforces the allegations made against this force and demand for its withdrawal had become strident. Mishra as a DIG had served in Manipur and knows the state much better than many of the defence experts who churn out their unsubstantiated views without understanding the issues involved in TV debates. He was good at maintaining interpersonal relationships with different sections of the society in Manipur, though he was more known for his misadventure at Sajik Tampak.
But it needs to be understood that one force cannot act on its own, and it must have the sanction of the higher ups which is the Indian deep state for strategic reasons and that particular force is now becoming the fall guy. The main purpose had been to contain the NSCN (I-M), NSCN (K) and the Meitei Insurgent Groups (MIG) then operating both in India and Myanmar by using the Kuki. As a consequence of the Naga-Kuki conflict in 1992 a large number of Kuki migrated to Moreh and Churachandpur side from Naga dominated areas and the KNA was allegedly encouraged by this force to establish a base at Moreh.
KNA, a militant group in Myanmar not only established a base in Manipur but also became an armed group here. Even the Meitei helped the Kuki to establish in Moreh as the Meitei and the NSCN (I-M) were at loggerheads then. The use of Kuki to contain IM and MIGs allegedly still continues with covert support and during the current crisis, some of the support perhaps become overt, leading to allegations. To be fair, the force had become the whipping boy of both the warring communities after the arrest of some militants in Churachandpur and Kangpokpi recently.
BSF has reasons to be unhappy when border guard duty in the Moreh sector was transferred to AR under the “One Border, One Force” principle in 2002. Earlier BSF was doing the border duty and AR on CI ops. Assam Rifles was formerly known as Assam Frontier Force then Assam Military Police and finally Assam Rifles in 1917. From this force, 23 JCOs and 3174 sepoys were drafted to the Gorkha during WWI. If these men were not drafted, the Kuki rebellion would have been controlled in months not in years.
BSF had established a Subsidiary Training Centre at Churachandpur for training new recruits with a DIG centre at Koirengei but now the deployment is thin in Manipur, though due to the crisis some units had arrived in Manipur. Mishra expressed the feelings of the BSF on their marginalised role in Manipur. AR as a force is not trained for border duty and faces serious challenges though they are fairly successful in CI Ops in which they were trained. Their focus was not on border patrol, watch tower or border fencing but rely on ambushes.
The idea of one border, one force is not a bad idea and that is the reason this writer proposes the raising of a new force, Indo-Myanmar Border Police (IMBP) on the line of the Indo Tibetan Border Police. This new force may have about 25-26 Bns and the men drawn from the states with international borders with Myanmar up to say about half of the strength while the rest is filled up on an all India basis. The men will have local knowledge and this force if properly groomed will be effective. It is believed that both AR and BSF had proposed raising an additional 26 Bns to guard the Indo-Myanmar border of 1643 km, trained especially to guard the border.
Manipur has by now units from so many forces that coordinating these is no easy task, despite the Unified Command now headed by the Advisor (Security) (AS). Sometime in 2017-18, the top brass felt that due to the crackdown by the Tatmadaw on Naga and Meitei militants based in Myanmar, the situation was returning to normal in Manipur. Number of camps of MIGs in North Sagaing and Kachin were dismantled. After the Doklam and other incidents, the strength of 57 Mountain Division had dwindled with 2 of its Brigades being shifted elsewhere and the gap was filled up by the deployment of units from IGAR(East) in addition to those of the IGAR(South) which essentially look after Manipur.
Even though AR is administratively under MHA, operationally it is under the Command of the Indian Army with almost all officers on deputation from the army. The forces in Manipur are under the command of the 3 Corps based in Dimapur. Now there are three Major Generals, one heading the 57 Mountain Division with limited men on the ground, one IGAR(S) and the other IGAR(E). During this crisis very little had been heard about the role of the 57 Mtn Div indicating its truncated role in the state. Further with an IG of the CRPF, besides a DIG of BSF and others, it is no easy task for the AS to ensure coordination. Besides the intelligence agencies have their own way of doing things and it is even alleged that there is hardly any convergence in the reports of the various agencies thereby causing difficulties to those taking decisions in Delhi.
Despite allegations that the over-focus of the Indian Army role to Counter Terrorism since 2014 had affected the efficacy of the army to fight a normal war, one can say with some conviction that if the two brigades of 57 Mtn Div was stationed in Manipur the current situation would have been much better. This is not to undermine the other units in operation but one cannot compare the AR and the Indian army and this will be seconded by those officers who had commanded units in both the army and the AR.
India has a large Army but the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict of 2023 showed that it is not the number of men on the ground but the technology which is of paramount importance, even in conventional warfare. Various other conflicts showed the same outcome, be it the Russo-Ukraine war or the Israel-Hamas one. India though waking up a bit late is trying to ramp up technology but there are constraints. Against an authorised fighter squadron of 42, only 31 are in operation as the delivery of the new crafts are delayed for months. Similarly, with other equipment also, the effort to indigenise production of defence equipment is not rosy as many parts have to be imported.
India’s over confidence that the situation in Myanmar in 2017-18 will result in a situation in Manipur where it can be managed by CAPF/AR was thrown to the winds by the declaration of military rule in Myanmar in 2021 and the subsequent intensification of the action against the military junta in September 2023 by the ethnic armies, especially by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in Shan State and that had led to a situation where MIGs are allying with Shanni National Army fighting the Kuki armed group under the Conglomerate of PDF. SNA is aligned with the junta and so is the ZRA in Chin State.
Most of the ethnic armies in Myanmar except perhaps those from the Chin State do not demand independence but seek more autonomy. The role of China in Myanmar affairs has increased manifold and the threat of China looming over India’s eastern frontier is serious and worse than the position prior to 2017. For China to have an opening to the Bay of Bengal, Myanmar is critical to bypass the Malacca Strait which for all purposes is controlled by the US. China has limited sea coast, like Russia and it needs an opening to the Bay of Bengal for both economic and strategic purposes, and is working towards this end for decades.
The MIGs which was not able to make major recruitment for some time had been able to do so recently; thus the efforts of India had due to misreading of the events during the second decade of this century led to the revival of MIGs which now has the tacit support of the junta in Myanmar. The demand for Zalengam nation may become more forceful with most of the Chin State now under the control of the rebels and the conflict in Bangladesh with sympathy from the cognate tribes on the Indian side. Over reliance on the Kuki-Chin to control the IM and MIGs is unlikely to have a positive outcome and if one goes by history, Kuki-Chin will ultimately ally with China in the tussle between India and China, as they tend to associate with what they think is the bigger power.
(The views expressed are personal)
