Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh while campaigning in Manipur had said that he is ready to talk to the insurgent groups to discuss and address the issues raised by them. In the same election campaign, Union Home Minister Amit Shah promised to hold deliberations with all rebel groups and bring peace to the hills.
Well, the powerful Home Minister was talking about the hill based insurgent groups and militant outfits most of which are either under ceasefire or suspension of operations (SoO). What has been missing is the offer of talks to the valley based groups. Of course, state chief ministers, including the present N Biren Singh had been making fervent appeals to valley based groups to come to the negotiating table time and again. In the ‘homecoming’ ceremonies, such appeals are always the talking point. However, it is unclear as to how seriously state leaders are pursuing the matter of bringing valley-based groups to the negotiating table.
We know, these valley groups have been consistently rejecting the peace offer in statements issued to the media. But, that is the official line. There might be several reasons for outright rejection of such peace offers or invitation to talks. One of the reasons could be the question of sincerity on the part of GOI to resolve the political issues of the region, as often questioned by NSCN (I-M) during talks. Or maybe they see peace talks as a futile exercise with GOI rejecting the demand for independence at every turn of the talks.
At one point, the government at the Centre was so fixated on bringing NSCN (I-M) to the negotiating table as the group was considered as the ‘mother of all insurgencies’ in the Northeast and top ranking intelligence officials believed that once NSCN (I-M) is brought into the loop of negotiations, the other groups would follow suit. It is partly true in the case of Northeast as NSCN (I-M) was responsible for spawning many ethnic based insurgent groups in its effort to broaden its reach and control. But it was not so in the case of valley based groups of Manipur valley whose ideals are in direct contrast to the designs of NSCN IM and the dream of Naga integration.
NSCN (I-M) had been negotiating with the Government of India through interlocutors since 1997 and still there is no end in sight. The secret parleys began in 1995, when the then prime minister PV Narisimha Rao met Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu in Paris on June 15. The then home minister Rajesh Pilot again met them in Bangkok in November 1996.
Several Prime Ministers, including HD Devegowda and Atal Behari Vajpayee also met them at various locations outside the country secretly, besides scores of Intelligence and top officials of the Home Ministry, till it became official on June 14, 2001 when the then interlocutor K Padmanabhaiah signed the controversial ceasefire ‘without territorial limits’ with the NSCN (I-M) leaders. On the other hand, central leaders seem uninterested in going the extra mile to engage the valley groups. Before any official talks, secret feelers are sent and unofficial parleys are severally held in an effort to bring the groups into confidence. It is the standard exercise in any peace process and it was the same in the case of the Naga or Kuki groups. The official process did not come out of the blue, one fine day. Why is it not so in the case of valley groups?
Maybe, central leaders are looking for something substantial like nuisance value or striking capability of the groups before starting a process. It is a well-established fact that NSCN (I-M) and most of Kuki militant groups have clout among the hill populace and they have the capability to circumvent elections. While the IM group has still a striking capability anywhere in the region, the Kuki groups brought under SoO operate at will from their designated camps and meddle in the state assembly elections.
Maybe because, insurgent activities have really come down in the valley thereby leading to withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in recent times except for stray incidents by some rag-tag factions. Or maybe because, leaders and cadres of valley based groups have moved into the hinterlands with the fresh spell of military rule in Myanmar thereby reducing cross-border activities and reach among the common populace.
